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2Corruption as a social phenomenon has existed for a long time. The fight
against corruption takes on a special importance, however, when the scale of
corruptive practices approaches the point where we face an actual “globalization of
corruption” (Elliot (ed.), 1997).  It is indeed telling when the complexity and
hazardous nature of this threat prompts the President of the World Bank to lable it a
"cancer of corruption" (Mauro, 1997 (B), pp. 1, 3).
The Collins Dictionary of Sociology defines corruption as the refusal on the
part of governmental officials to accept expected standards of behavior because of
their personal wellbeing (Jerry, Jerry, 1999, p. 322).
In relevant economic literature one can find discussions on the nature, factors,
origin and effects of corruption (Mauro, 1997 (A), 1997 (B); Rose-Ackerman, 1997;
Tanzi, 1995; Levin, Tsirik, 1998 (A), pp. 40-47), and applicable mathematical models
(Levin, Tsirik, 1998 (A), 1998 (B); Polterovich, 1998).
One of the most prevalent forms of corruption is the tax offence – when a tax
officer accepts a bribe to overlook certain things in taxable operations to permit total
or partial tax evasion (Svensson, 1987; Kottke, 1998, pp. 535-621).  The problem of
corruption in tax administrations (Chander, Wilde, 1992; Levin, Tsirik, 1998 (B), pp.
34-39), by very its nature, is one of the cornerstones of the proverbial "shadow
economy" (Bogomolov, 1998, p. 104; Makarov, 1998, p.38) and has been the subject
of analyses, assessments and measurement in countless investigations(Adams,
Fitchett (ed.), 1992; Bhattacharrya, 1999; Feinstein, 1999; Giles, 1999; Tanzi; 1999;
Thomas, 1999; Makarov, 1998).  The problem of the "shadow economy" is especially
damaging in those countries where post-communist transformations are underway,
3where there is a dire need for institutional adjustments (Papava, Khaduri, 1997, 1998;
Ékes, 1994).
To assess of the extent of corruption, various indexes have been used.  The
objective of this paper is to determine indicators for that most important element of
the "shadow economy" - corruption in tax administrations.
As is known, the index is a relative indicator which characterizes the changes
(i.e. dynamics) in occurrence over time, or the effects of comparing these occurrences
in space (Baklanov, 1972, p. 5).
On the basis of general principles of the theory of indexes (see for example
Allen, 1975; Baklanov, 1972; Köves, 1983; Kovalevski, 1989), the Minister of the
Economy of Georgia, Professor Vladimer Papava developed Tax Corruption Indexes,
which permit quite accurate assessments of the corruption in the tax administration
(Papava, 2000).
To determine the “Papava Indexes of Tax Corruption”, first, one has to reckon
potential tax revenues estimated according to the economy at the present stage of
development. One must then compare this potential amount with the actual taxes
collected, and before proceeding with any calculations all amendments to the tax law
should be excluded.
The GDP is the crucial parameter on the basis of which the above-mentioned
indexes should be calculated nationwide; with respect to individual sectors of the
economy or individual regions, the value added produced in the given sector or region
must be used as such a parameter.  It is worth noting that given the object of
establishing such indexes, the GDP, in turn, requires certain adjustments. This is
because different tax regimes are used with respect to different elements of that
parameter.
First of all, external trade should be excluded from the GDP.
4As is known, imports in addition to all other taxes imposed in the country, are
subject to import duty.  At the same time, tax revenues from imports can be
substantially affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate. With respect to imports,
the level of tax corruption should be assessed separately.
Exports should be excluded from the GDP.  The reason is that according to
relevant international practices only profit tax and personal income tax on exported
goods are payable to the State budget.  Exports are not subject to VAT, excise duties,
and export tariffs. This reduces the amount of actual tax revenues.  Also, with respect
to exports, the degree of tax corruption should be reckoned separately.
It is recommended the all those sectors and regions (e.g. regions in which a
free economic zone is established) to which different tax regimes are applicable be
excluded from inclusion in the GDP. Agriculture is a good example of this type of
sectors.  In the Georgian context, for example, there is just actually only one type of
tax - land tax - which is applicable to agriculture.  With respect to each of such sectors
and regions, the rate of tax corruption should be assessed separately. The method,
which should be applied in these cases, should be identical to the one applied to
exports. For the sake of simplicity in calculation, let us assume that there is no free
economic zone in the country.
For the purpose of formalization of indexes, let us introduce the following
symbols:
Q0 is the nominal GDP for the base year;
Q~
0
_   the adjusted nominal GDP (subject to the above    assumptions1) for the
base year;
Q1    _     the nominal GDP for the relative year;
                                        
1 Specifically, adjustments should be effected by excluding foreign trade and the value added produced in agriculture and consumed
inside the country.
5Q~
1
 _  the adjusted nominal GDP (subject to the above assumptions) for the
relative year;
M 0   _     total imports for the base year (in US $);
M 1    _    total imports for the relative year (in US $);
? 0     _   the exchange rate of the national currency for the base year;
? 1   _  the exchange rate of the national currency for the relative year;
X 0  _   total exports for the base year;
X 1  _   total exports for the relative year;
A0  _    the value added produced in agriculture and consumed domestically for
the base year;
A1  _    the value added produced in agriculture and consumed domestically for
the relative year;
T T0  _      tax revenues for the base year collected by the tax service;
T T1 _    tax revenues for the relative year collected by the tax service;
T
T~
0
 _  adjusted tax revenues (subject to the above assumptions2) for the base
year collected by the tax service;
T
T~
1
  _   adjusted tax revenues (subject to the above assumptions) for the
relative year collected by the tax service;
T M0 _ tax revenues collected from imports for the base year;
T M1 _ tax revenues collected from imports for the relative year;
T X0 _ tax revenues collected from exports for the base year;
T X1 _ tax revenues collected from exports for the relative year;
6T A0 _        tax revenues from agriculture for the base year;
T A1 _ tax revenues from agriculture for the relative year.
According to the above symbols:
Q~
0 AXMQ o 0000 ??? ?? ? ,
Q~
1 AXMQ 11111 ???? ?? ,
T
T~
0
= TTTT AXMT 0000 ??? ,
TTTTT
AXMTT
11111
~ ???? .
Given the above symbols, let us determine the parameters of tax revenues to
be raised for the State budget:
Q
Tt
T
~
~
0
0
0
?  indicates the share of adjusted tax revenues, collected by the tax
service, in the adjusted GDP for the base year;
Q
Tt
T
~
~
1
1
1
?  _ the share of adjusted tax revenues, collected by the tax service, in the
adjusted GDP for the relative year.
 As was noted above, the "Papava Index of Tax Corruption " represents the
correlation of actual tax revenues with potential revenues.  The latter should be
calculated by multiplying all tax revenues ratio to GDP for the base year by the
adjusted GDP for the relative year: QtT TP
~
101
?? . This formula will show us all
                                                                                                                                       
2 Specifically, adjustments should be effected by excluding all tax revenues collected from foreign trade and agriculture.
7potential tax revenues which could be collected by the government only on the basis
of changes in economic activites, while tax legislation and administration remain
unchanged.
By subtracting the actual from potential tax revenues, we can get an increase
(or decrease) in tax revenues: TT
TTP ~
11
? . This could result from improvement of tax
administration and changes in the tax legislation. By deriving percentage of such an
increase (or decrease) from the above-mentioned potential tax revenues we can get a
value which shows an increase (or decrease) in additional tax revenue per unit of
potential tax revenue, resulting from an improved tax administration and amendments
to the tax legislation. If we reflect in our calculations amendments to the tax
legislation (in particular, actual tax revenues for the base year should be adjusted on
the basis of tax legislation applicable in the relative year), then this ratio will represent
the “Papava Index of Tax Corruption in Tax Service Excluding Agriculture and
Exports”3:
t
tt
Qt
QtQt
T
TTI TP
TTP
T
TC
0
10
10
1110
1
11 ~
~~~ ?
?
?
?
?
? .
If 0?I TTC  (or 0?I TTC ), then we have an increase (or decrease) in the level of
corruption4.
                                        
3 This and all subsequent formulas are developed directly by Vladimer Papava.
4 Theoretically one can not exclude the probability that when 0?I TTC , such a situation may result from recruiting less
qualified staff in tax offices, or general slackness of employees, or lack of motivation, which situation, ultimately, will
encourage some employees, if not all of them, to take advantage of this general negligence and get involved in corrupted
practices.  This remark can be applicable to all indexes below.
8As was noted above, agriculture should be calculated separatly because it is
subject to a different tax regime.  With regard to agriculture, the following parameters
should first be determined:
A
Tt
A
A
0
0
0
? and  
A
Tt
A
A
1
1
1
? ,
where t A0  and t
A
1
 represent tax revenues per unit of value added derived from
agriculture in the base and relative year respectively.
Given these parameters, it is easy to calculate the potential tax revenues that
can be derived from agriculture AtT AAP 101 ?  and, accordingly, the "Papava Index of
Tax Corruption in Agriculture":
t
tt
At
AtAt
T
TTI A
o
AA
A
AA
AP
AAP
A
TC
10
10
1110
1
11
?
?
?
?
?
? .
Here we must note once again that if in the given country, any sector (or
region) other than agriculture is subject to a different tax regime than that applied to
the rest of the country, then all relevant indexes should be calculated for that sector
(or region) separately.
As was mentioned above, exports should also be subject to a separate study.
According to the above symbols:
X
Tt
X
X
0
0
0
?  and  
X
Tt
X
X
1
1
1
? ,
9where t X0  and t
X
1
 represent tax revenues per unit of export for the base and relative
year respectively.
On the basis of such parameters, we can calculate a potential quantity of tax
revenues from exports  XtT XXP 101 ?  and, accordingly, the "Papava Index of Tax
Corruption for Exports":
t
tt
Xt
XtXt
T
TTI X
o
XX
X
XX
XP
XXP
X
TC
10
10
1110
1
11
?
?
?
?
?
? .
Given the above indexes, it is easy to calculate what the loss or benefit to the
State Budget would be as a result of an increase or decrease in the level of corruption
at tax offices.  If we compare this quantity ( TITITI XPXTCAPATCTPTTC 111 ?? ) to all potential
tax revenues facilitated by economic development ( TTT XPAPTP 111 ?? ) and assume that
TTTI
TTPTPT
TC
~
111
?? , TTTI AAPAPATC 111 ??  and TTTI XXPXPXTC 111 ?? , then we can get the
“Papava Integrated Index of Tax Corruption in Tax Service”:
T
T
TTT
TTTTTTI P
f
XPAPTP
XXPAAPTTP
TC
1
1
111
1111111 1
~
??
??
?????
? ,
where: T f1  represents actual tax collections made by the tax service in the relative
year  ( TTTT
XATf
1111
~ ??? );
T P1  _ all potential domestic tax revenues for the relative year    resulting from
economic development ( TTTT XPAPTPP 1111 ??? ).
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If 01 ?I TC  (or 01 ?I TC ), then we have an increase (or decrease) in the level of
corruption at tax offices.
When we perform similar calculations with respect to customs, we must
replace the value added by the value of imports, calculated at the current exchange
rate of national currency, and determine the following parameters:
M
TC
M
00
0
0 ?
?  represents the ratio of customs revenues to imports for the base year;
M
TC
M
11
1
1 ?
?  _ the ratio of customs revenues to imports for the relative year.
Potential customs revenues should be calculated by multiplying the ratio of
tax revenues in customs for the base year by the average exchange rate for the same
year and total imports for the relative year: MCT MPc 1001 ?? .
By analogy with the above indexes, the "Papava Index of Tax Corruption in
Customs" will be:
          
C
CC
C
CC
MC
MCMC
T
TTI MP
cMP
M
Tc
1
10
00
1100
100
111100
1
11
?
?
??
?
?? ???????? ,
where 
?
??
0
1?  is the ratio of increase (or decrease) of the national currency exchange
rate .
If 0?I MTC  (or 0?I MTC ), then we have an increase (or decrease) in the level of
corruption at customs offices.
If we combine the corruption rates at tax and customs offices with each other,
then we will get the overall national parameter of that phenomenon or, in other words,
we will get the "Papava Integrated Index of National Tax Corruption":
11
TT
TT
TTTT
TTTTTTTTI MPP
Mf
MP
T
XPAPTP
MMPXXPAAPP
TC
11
11
111
111111112 1
~
?
?
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???
???????
? .
If 02 ?I TC  (or 02 ?I TC ), then we have an overall increase (or decrease) in the
degree of tax corruption at the national level.
In addition to the above indices, one can calculate the "Papava Index of
Payroll Tax Corruption" for non-budgetary (health and employment) funds.
If we assume that the amount mobilized by the non-budgetary funds for the
base and relative year respectively is P0  and P1 , and the wages are W 0  and W 1 , we
can calculate the relevant rates of revenues generation by the above funds:
W
Pt P
0
0
0
?  and 
W
Pt P
1
1
1
? .
For the relative year the potential size of revenues from nonbudgetary funds
will amount to WtP Pp 101 ? , and the "Papava Index of Payroll Tax Corruption"  will
be:
t
tt
Wt
WtWt
P
PPI P
Pp
P
P
o
p
p
Pc
0
10
10
111
1
11
?
?
?
?
?
? .
If 0?I PC  (or 0?I PC ), then we have an increase (or decrease) in the level of
corruption for non-budgetary funds.
Given all the above calculations, we can get the "Papava Integrated Index of
National Tax and Payment Corruption":
12
PTT
PTT
PTTTT
PPTTTTTTTTI PMPP
Mf
PMPXPAPMP
PMMPXXPAAP
TPC
111
111
111!1
11111111113 1
~
??
??
??
????
?????????
? .
All above indexes were calculated in the Georgia context for the Year 1999.
The results were very interesting, enabling us to identify existing reserves in the area
of taxes.  In particular, in 1999 the "Papava Integrated Index of Tax Corruption in Tax
Service" amounted to –4.3 per cent.  This means that at the cost of improving the
administration of tax offices, and thereby reducing corruptive practices, the State
Budget gained an additional 4.3 tetri per lari in potential tax revenue.
Unfortunately, the situation at customs offices relfects the oposite -  the
"Papava Index of Tax Corruption" amounts to 25.2 per cent.  In other words, due to a
deterioration in administration and expanding corruption, the State Budget lost 25.2
tetri per lari of potential tax revenues.
The "Papava Indexes of Tax Corruption" were also calculated by sectors and
regions.  For these particular purposes, the GDP was replaced by the value added
produced in each sector and region.  It was found out that with respect to regions the
"Papava Indexes of Tax Corruption" ranged from +11 per cent to –15 per cent, while
with respect to sectors from +24 per cent (energy sector and trade) to –30 per cent
(healthcare).
In agriculture the "Papava Index of Tax Corruption" makes up 3 per cent; in
other words, in the sector of agriculture, due to the deterioration of administration and
growth of corruptive practices, the State Budget lost 3 tetri per lari in potential tax
revenues.
On the basis of all the above calculations, the "Papava Integrated Index of
National Tax Corruption" was fixed at 6.6 per cent, which means that in 1999, the
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State Budget lost 6.6 tetri per lari in potential tax revenues which resulted from the
growth of domestic economic activities.
The "Papava Index of Payroll Tax Payment Corruption" for 1999 was
calculated at 12.9 per cent.  In other words, per lari of potential revenues, the loss of
non-budgetary funds amounted to 12.9 tetri.
The "Papava Integrated Index of National Tax and Payment Corruption" for
1999 was fixed at 7.9 per cent, which indicates that the shortfall in the State Budget
and non-budgetary funds per lari of potential revenues was 7.9 tetri.
In conclusion, it must be emphasized once again that the "Papava Indexes of
Tax Corruption" give a quite detailed picture of the deterioration (or improvement) in
the level of corruption in any given sector, region or area. It thereby enabled the
government to set forth specific measures in its fight against corruption.
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